Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention
Electronic Access:
Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file
Summary:
To better fulfill its crisis-prevention mandate, IMF surveillance needs to provide stronger incentives for countries to follow good policies and for markets to avoid boom-bust cycles in capital flows. To this end, surveillance should culminate in a summary public assessment of the quality of a country's policies and stipulate the actions needed to address shortcomings. A country's potential access to IMF credits should be linked to the quality of its policies in noncrisis periods in order to create stronger incentives for better policies and reduce incentives for capital to flow where it cannot be used in socially beneficial ways.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2005/206
Subject:
Capital markets Crisis prevention Emerging and frontier financial markets Exchange rates Financial crises Financial markets Foreign exchange Tax incentives
English
Publication Date:
November 1, 2005
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451862256/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA2005206
Pages:
23
Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org