Lessons from Singapore on Raising Fertility Rates
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- Authors: POH LIN TAN
- Published: March 2, 2020
Context and overview
- Globally, a total fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 is now the norm for advanced economies; the very lowest rates are found in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and higher-income Chinese cities, including Shanghai and Hong Kong SAR.
- Singapore’s fertility rate deteriorated from 1.41 in 2001 to 1.16 in 2018.
- The Singaporean pronatalist package (introduced in 2001 and enhanced over the years) currently includes paid maternity leave, childcare subsidies, tax relief and rebates, one-time cash gifts, and grants for companies that implement flexible work arrangements.
- The government subsidizes up to 75 percent of assisted reproductive technology treatment costs for qualifying married couples and allows them to tap into their medical accounts under the national savings program to pay for the procedures.
- Working mothers receive childcare subsidies of S$300 a month for formal childcare; lower-income families receive more.
- Japan has about 5 percent of babies born through IVF.
- The mean age of childbearing has increased by approximately one year a decade among OECD countries (Mills and others 2011).
- Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted that, with help from immigration, a fertility of rate of 1.3–1.4 may be enough to meet the country’s needs (Yong 2019).
Major findings (organized by explicit lessons)
- Lesson 1: Address the rising age at childbearing
- The age composition of women giving birth in Singapore has been especially dramatic: women ages 20–24 are now as likely to give birth as women ages 40–44 and far less likely than women ages 35–39.
- The steep decline in fertility among women in their 20s has not been offset by higher birth rates among women in their 30s; instead, these missing babies have vanished permanently.
- Higher ages at parenthood reduce the probability families will achieve a two-child-family ideal because of unforeseen changes (divorce, health, or income shocks) or reduced biological ability to conceive and carry a child to term.
- Singapore’s instruments are largely not age-sensitive; few are designed specifically to allow women to become mothers at peak childbearing ages, representing a lost opportunity to cater to the most receptive group of prospective parents.
- Lesson 2: Reproductive technologies are not a panacea
- Public beliefs include that good health and IVF can offset age-related infertility; many underestimate the health risks of IVF and obstetric complications from delayed childbearing (Daniluk, Koert, and Cheung 2012).
- Access to IVF and other reproductive technologies is insufficient to ensure that older women will have enough babies to compensate for declines among younger women.
- Example: Japan combines a high percentage of IVF births (about 5 percent) with one of the lowest fertility rates.
- Lesson 3: Household production cannot be fully outsourced
- Despite robust formal-sector childcare and the ability to hire relatively low-cost domestic workers, Singapore’s low fertility persists.
- High opportunity costs of childbearing stem from gender inequality at home, where caring for children and household chores place greater burdens on women (McDonald 2006).
- Formal childcare and domestic help help but cannot substitute for parents’ spending quality time; institutional support—parental leave and flexible work arrangements that allow families to spend more time together—is also needed.
- Lesson 4: Acknowledge human capital’s true cost
- Very low fertility countries (Japan, Singapore, others) tend to score very well in human capital rankings (PISA, World Bank Human Capital Index).
- There is a trade-off between quantity and “quality” of children; East Asian institutional emphasis on early life achievements increases returns from investing in children’s human capital, raising the cost per child (Tan, Morgan, and Zagheni 2016).
- Many singles defer marriage for education or career success; most married couples have children but stop at one or two due to high education-related expenses and the desire to invest more in each child.
- Cultural and institutional pressures that heavily reward achievement and penalize lack of ambition may need to be confronted to raise fertility to replacement levels.
Policy implications and recommendations
- Prioritize age-sensitive policies:
- Design instruments specifically to encourage childbearing at peak biological ages rather than relying solely on incentives aimed at all groups.
- Target support toward couples already married and desiring at least two children, as it is easier to help them realize fertility goals than to change preferences of singles or childless couples who do not want more children.
- Reassess the role of reproductive technologies:
- Maintain subsidies and access but recognize that subsidizing assisted reproductive technology is not sufficient to raise aggregate fertility.
- Improve public education on the limitations and health risks of delayed childbearing and IVF.
- Strengthen institutional support for parent–child time:
- Complement formal childcare and domestic-help options with stronger parental leave policies and incentives for flexible work arrangements to reduce the time-cost burden on parents, especially mothers.
- Address human capital and cultural trade-offs:
- Consider policies and societal shifts that reduce the extreme pressures associated with early-life achievement to lower the perceived and real costs of childrearing.
- Acknowledge that raising fertility to replacement levels may require confronting broader social and cultural norms, not just enhancing pronatalist incentives.
Scenarios and urgency
- Even with enhancements, policymakers may realistically aim for a more modest fertility target (for example, 1.4) rather than replacement.
- Without timely action, demographic momentum will reduce the share of couples of childbearing age, making any future increases in fertility less effective; “It’s now or never.”
Poh Lin Tan, “Lessons from Singapore on Raising Fertility Rates,” F&D Magazine, March 2020.
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