Low-Income Countries

Smart fiscal policy can help restore price stability and lessen the impact of the cost-of-living crisis.

Low-income countries face huge economic challenges and financing needs. They rely on international institutions, including the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, for vital policy and financial support. Economically stronger countries have a responsibility to contribute to the funding of this support.

Despite decades of rapid growth, regional inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa persist. 

With fossil fuels likely to remain expensive for some time, governments should let retail prices rise to promote energy conservation while protecting poorer households.

More progressive taxes with fewer exemptions would help governments pay for immediate spending priorities and make societies fairer. 

An international floor price for carbon could speed the world’s transition to green energy without compromising countries’ competitiveness.

The setting of public utility prices involves balancing various competing government policy objectives, from equity concerns to ensuring the financial sustainability of providers and balancing public finances. In practice, public utility pricing often departs significantly from government objectives and tends to be characterized by unnecessarily complex price schedules, below cost-recovery tariff rates, and sectoral inefficiencies that contribute to large fiscal costs. Countries commonly embark on utility pricing reform in response to these heavy fiscal pressures. The paper discusses various reform options available to governments, with a focus on residential pricing schedules, highlighting their fiscal, financial, redistributive, and efficiency implications.

In developing economies, a shift to working from home during the COVID-19 pandemic varies substantially. An increase in teleworking days per week ranges from 0.7 to 17.6 percentage points across 10 developing countries covered by an online survey to about 500 respondents per country. An estimated income discount associated with telework disappeared temporarily at the onset of the pandemic. A calibrated model indicates that workers’ preferences to telework may largely depend on their educational attainments. Whether telework will sustain in these countries could depend on obstacles to telework, particularly for workers with less education, and a degree of economy-wide externality.

This paper analyses how financial inclusion in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) compares to peers in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Using individual-level survey data, it shows that the probability of being financially included, as proxied by account ownership in financial institutions, is substantially lower across gender, income groups, and education levels in all CCA countries relative to CEE comparators. Key determinants of this financial inclusion gap are lower financial and human development indices, weak rule of law, and physical access to bank branches or ATMs. This suggests that targeted policies aimed at boosting financial and human development, strengthening the rule of law, and supporting fintech solutions can broaden financial inclusion in the CCA.

With limited financing options, increasing investment efficiency will be a critical avenue to building infrastructure for many countries, particularly in the context of post-pandemic recovery and rising debt emanating from higher energy costs and other pressures. Estimating investment efficiency, however, presents many methodological pitfalls. Using various methods—–stochastic frontier analysis, data envelopment analysis (DEA), and bootstrapped DEA—this paper estimates efficiency scores for a wide range of countries employing metrics of infrastructure quantity and utilization. We find that efficiency scores are relatively robust across methodologies and data used. A considerable efficiency gap exists: Removing all inefficiencies could increase infrastructure output by 55 percent overall, when averaging across 12 estimation approaches—in particular, by 45 percent for advanced economies, 54 percent for emerging countries, and 65 percent for low income countries. Infrastructure output would increase by a still-sizeable 30 percent if instead of eliminating all efficiency, countries achieved the efficiency level of their income group’s 90th percentile.

Remittance flows in emerging market and developing economies were surprisingly resilient during the COVID-19 crisis, providing much-needed income support for remittance-receiving households. However, households were impacted differently across income distributions. Using novel high-frequency household panel data for Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that as household income fell during the pandemic, remittance-receiving households were more affected than non-remittance-receiving households. Importantly, we find that the incomes of poor, remittance-receiving households in the Kyrgyz Republic were more adversely affected than their non-remittance-receiving counterparts. In contrast, in Georgia, affluent remittance-receiving households experienced more significant income declines than poor remittance-receiving households. This heterogeneous impact can largely be explained by variations in the effectiveness of social safety nets in the two countries. Our results have important policy implications. Although remittances remained resilient during the pandemic, they affected households differently. As such, policymakers should prioritize addressing gaps in social safety nets to support the most vulnerable.

European housing markets are at a turning point as the cost-of-living crisis has eroded real incomes and the surge in interest rates has made borrowers more vulnerable to financial distress. This paper aims to (i) shed light on the risks in European housing markets, (ii) quantify household vulnerabilties, (iii) assess banking sector implications and (iv) examine policies’ effectiveness using simulations based on microdata from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC). Under the baseline IMF macroeconomic forecast, the share of households that could struggle to meet basic expenses could rise by 10 pps reaching a third of all households by end 2023. Under an adverse scenario, 45 percent of households could be financially stretched, representing over 40 percent of mortgage debt and 45 percent of consumer debt. The impact on the banking sector seems contained under the baseline forecast, though there are pockets of vulnerability. A 20 percent house price correction could deplete CET1 capital by 100-300 basis points. Fiscal measures, such as subsidies to the bottom income tercile, could save 7 percent of households from financial distress at an estimated cost of 0.8 percent of GDP.