Eurostat: Trafficking of Arms
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Introduction
- Illicit firearms trafficking is one of Europol's priority crime areas.
- In 2014, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation estimated that there were almost half a million lost or stolen firearms in the EU.
- Other estimates indicate that "the illegal firearms trade generates between EUR 125 million to EUR 236 million per year globally, which represents between 10 to 20 % of the total trade in legal firearms."
- A key feature of illicit firearms trafficking is that it is mainly caused by diversions from the legal firearms trade and from conflict-related stockpiles.
- The illegal firearms trade occurs on both large and small scales and is carried out by a variety of methods, some more sophisticated than others.
Scope, Methodology, Compilation Practices, and Data Sources
- Definition:
- A working definition can be borrowed from Article 3(e) of the United Nations Firearms Protocol: "…the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 8 of this Protocol."
- An illegal firearms trafficker can be defined as a person who deals or trades in illegal firearms and is considered self-employed; economic activity classified under NACE rev. 2 as "Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets".
- Data availability and typical proxies:
- Available data on illicit firearms trafficking is scarce overall.
- Police and customs seizure data are common proxies for quantities, but seizures represent only a fraction of all illicit firearms trafficking and tend to be volatile.
- Supply-side models are better suited for modeling the illegal firearms trade; adjustments for perceived detection rates are necessary.
- Other input data for supply-side models may include firearm diversions (thefts/losses); crimes committed with firearms; firearms registries; and legal production and trade of firearms.
- Price data sources may include Member State interior ministries, police records, investigative reports, research, and cryptomarkets.
- Evidence suggests prices quoted in the Dark Net tend to be above the average for a number of countries.
- In conflict zones, prices tend to increase as security decreases.
- Estimation practice:
- Estimates are usually calculated for a given benchmark year and then extrapolated.
- Proxies for extrapolation can be found in crime statistics, for instance by using firearms-related homicide rates.
- Market scale assessments:
- Various sources indicate that the firearms trafficking market in Europe is in general rather small and that "trafficking is almost exclusively a supplementary rather than a primary source of income for a small number of organised criminal groups involved."
- Smekens and Verbruggen (2005) estimate a maximum annual benchmark value of 12 million euro due to trafficking of firearms in the Netherlands, which they describe as "negligible in the context of the [Dutch] national accounts."
- For these reasons, estimates of this illegal economic activity are not included in the EU national accounts and balance of payments data.
Current Challenges and Conclusions
- Recording and classification:
- Trafficking of arms is conceptually similar and follows the same manner of recording as smuggling of other products.
- Unlike most other smuggled products, firearms are durable (for example, "a well-maintained AK-47 will last indefinitely"), raising attention to potential misclassification issues and risks of double-counting.
- Data limitations and modeling implications:
- Seizure volatility necessitates models based on long-term trend analysis when possible.
- Detection-rate adjustments are essential because seizures capture only a fraction of actual trafficking.
- Supply-side modeling is preferred, but reliable inputs (diversions, registries, legal production/trade, crime linkage) are needed.
- Price measurement caveats:
- Cryptomarket price data may be higher than national averages and should be used cautiously.
- Conflict-related price dynamics (prices increase as security decreases) should be accounted for in analyses.
References