IMF Working Papers

Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State

By Christian Harm, Joshua Charap

July 1, 1999

Download PDF

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Christian Harm, and Joshua Charap. Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1999) accessed December 13, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.

Subject: Corruption, Crime, Labor, National accounts, Personal income, Public sector wages, Technology

Keywords: Anarchy, Combat technology, Corruption, Dictatorship, Gang member, Governance, Government objective, Interest group rent-seeking, Maximization problem, Palace revolution, Personal income, Public sector wages, Rent-seeking activity, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    24

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 1999/091

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0911999

  • ISBN:

    9781451851496

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941