Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

Author/Editor:

James M. Boughton

Publication Date:

September 1, 2003

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2003/191

Subject:

Balance of payments Capital inflows Depreciation Exchange rates Foreign exchange National accounts Political economy Poverty Poverty reduction Structural reforms

Frequency:

Annually

English

Publication Date:

September 1, 2003

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451859737/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1912003

Pages:

25

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