Central Bank Boards Around the World : Why Does Membership Size Differ?

Author/Editor:

Helge Berger ; Tonny Lybek ; Volker Nitsch

Publication Date:

December 1, 2006

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Series:

Working Paper No. 06/281

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 2006

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451865417/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2006281

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

46

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