Central Bank Governance : A Survey of Boards and Management

Author/Editor:

JoAnne Morris ; Tonny Lybek

Publication Date:

December 1, 2004

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank. While central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of the governing bodies. This paper surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries and classifies the governance structure according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members. The paper concludes that an appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors. The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.

Series:

Working Paper No. 04/226

Subject:

Central bank accountability Central bank governance Central bank independence Central banks Central banks and their policies Monetary policy

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 2004

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451875416/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2262004

Format:

Paper

Pages:

53

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