Working Papers
2024
March 8, 2024
Understanding Inflation Dynamics: The Role of Global Shocks in CEMAC
Description: As in the rest of the world, inflation in CEMAC surged more quickly and persistently than expected during the 2021–23 period. This paper examines the drivers of inflation dynamics and the contribution of global shocks to inflation persistence in CEMAC. We use a Phillips curve framework combined with the local projections method. Our results confirm the prominent role of global factors in driving inflation dynamics. Global commodity food and oil price fluctuations, and shipping costs are the main factors explaining the large variability in headline inflation. Further, we find that global price shocks have sizable and persistent effects on domestic headline inflation, with differences in the magnitude and speed of pass-through. The pass-through from commodity food price fluctuations to headline inflation is higher and more persistent than that of other global price shocks, reflecting the large share of food in the consumption baskets, which makes inflation more vulnerable to direct effects of international food shocks, but also larger second-round effects.
March 8, 2024
Strengthening Income Stabilization through Social Protection in Emerging and Developing Economies: The Brazilian Experience
Description: Social protection programs are crucial for stabilizing household income, especially during crises. Brazil's response to the pandemic, the Auxilio Emergencial (AE) program, demonstrated the value of a resilient social safety net and digital tools. This study assesses AE's effectiveness in income stabilization, poverty reduction, and inequality. Results show that the pre-pandemic social protection system would have only buffered about a quarter of income loss, with unemployment insurance more significant for higher-income households, and social safety net transfers crucial for lower-income households, especially those in informal employment. AE successfully supported lower-income households during the pandemic, but its generosity went beyond the stabilization of income, resulting in large fiscal costs.
March 8, 2024
Debt Surges—Drivers, Consequences, and Policy Implications
Description: Many countries find themselves with elevated debt levels, increased debt vulnerabilities, and tight financing conditions, while also facing increased spending needs for development and transition to a greener economy. This paper aims to place the current debt landscape in a historical context and investigate the drivers of debt surges, to what degree they result in a crisis as well as examine post-surge debt trajectories and under what conditions debt follows a non-declining path. We find that fiscal policy and stock-flow adjustments play important roles in debt dynamics with the valuation effects arising from currency depreciation explaining more than half of stock flow adjustments in LICs. Debt surges are estimated to result in a financial crisis with a probability of 11–20 percent and spending-driven fiscal expansions during debt surges tend to result in a high probability of non-declining debt path.
March 8, 2024
Accounting for Climate Risks in Costing the Sustainable Development Goals
Description: This paper evaluates the additional spending needed to meet core targets of selected Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while accounting for the associated cost to address climate risks. The SDGs under study are those related to human and physical capital development. An additional 3.8 percent of global GDP, or US$3.4 trillion, of public and private spending will be required by 2030 to achieve a strong performance in the selected SDGs while addressing associated climate risks. This includes an increase of 0.4 percent of global GDP (US$358 billion) compared to estimates that do not account for mitigation and adaptation needs within these sectors. LIDCs and SSA experience the highest climate-related cost augmentation relative to GDP, while EMEs (driven by large Asian emerging economies) bear the largest cost in absolute terms.
March 8, 2024
Geoeconomic Fragmentation and International Diversification Benefits
Description: This paper applies the two-country open-economy model with trade in stocks and bonds of Coeurdacier et al. (2010) to quantify the loss of international diversification benefits for major advanced economies, which have a significant presence in international financial markets, under geoeconomic fragmentation. We perform counterfactual simulations under different hypothetical fragmentation scenarios in which these economies are unable to trade with geopolitically distant countries, as measured by voting disagreement on foreign policy issues at the United Nations General Assembly meetings during 2012-2021. The simulation results imply a potentially significant loss of international diversification benefits of financial openness for the considered advanced economies by limiting trading to partner countries that are geopolitical allies with highly synchronized business cycles.
March 8, 2024
Monetary Policy with Uncertain Inflation Persistence
Description: When uncertain about inflation persistence, central banks are well-advised to adopt a robust strategy when setting interest rates. This robust approach, characterized by a "better safe than sorry" philosophy, entails incurring a modest cost to safeguard against a protracted period of deviating inflation. Applied to the post-pandemic period of exceptional uncertainty and elevated inflation, this strategy would have called for a tightening bias. Specifically, a high level of uncertainty surrounding wage, profit, and price dynamics requires a more front-loaded increase in interest rates compared to a baseline scenario which the policymaker fully understands how shocks to those variables are transmitted to inflation and output. This paper provides empirical evidence of such uncertainty and estimates a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the euro area to derive a robust interest rate path for the ECB which serves to illustrate the case for insuring against inflation turning out to have greater persistence.
March 1, 2024
Climate Policies as a Catalyst for Green FDI
Description: This paper assesses the role of climate policies as a catalyst of low carbon technologies deployment through foreign direct investment (FDI). Leveraging detailed cross-border project-level information, it identifies “green” FDI and finds that a higher number of active climate policies is associated with higher levels of green FDI inflows. Importantly, climate policies do not appear to be linked to lower levels of non-green projects, suggesting relatively small overall costs from the green transition. The paper also finds heterogeneity across sectors and policy instruments. The association between climate policies and green projects is particularly strong in energy and manufacturing, and when the composition of the recipient's climate portfolio is tilted towards binding policies (e.g., taxes and regulation) and expenditure measures. Finally, results point to policy spillovers, whereby larger climate policy portfolios in the source country are linked to higher green FDI outflows, but green subsidies can discourage them. This, in turn, implies that subsidies could hamper efforts to deploy low-carbon technologies across countries.
March 1, 2024
Do Capital Inflows Spur Technology Diffusion? Evidence from a New Technology Adoption Index
Description: We construct a novel measure of technology adoption, the Embodied Technology Imports Indicator (ETI), available for 181 countries over the period 1970-2020. The ETI measures the technological intensity of imports of each country by leveraging patent data from PATSTAT and product-level trade data from COMTRADE. We use this index to assess the link between capital flows and the diffusion of new technologies across emerging economies and low-income countries. Through a local projection difference-in-differences approach, we establish that variations in statutory capital flow regulations increase technological intensity by 7-9 percentage points over 5 to 10 years. This increase is accompanied by a significant 28-33 pp rise in the volume of gross capital inflows, driven primarily by foreign direct investment (21 pp increase), and a 9 to 12 percentage points shift in the level of Real GDP per capita in PPP terms.
March 1, 2024
Trade Spillovers of Domestic Subsidies
Description: As governments resort to industrial policies to achieve economic and non-economic objectives, the number of subsidies implemented each year has more than tripled in the last decade. Using detailed data across a large number of advanced and emerging economies, we empirically investigate the effects of domestic subsidies on international trade flows. Estimates from a difference-in-difference specification show that on average subsidies promote both exports and imports. These effects are partly driven by selection into subsidies, as governments target export-oriented and import-competing products. The results however mask significant differences across countries. Specifically, exports of subsidized products from G20 emerging markets increase 8 percent more than exports of other products, with no evidence of selection. The gravity estimates confirm that subsidies promote international relative to domestic trade. These spillover effects are concentrated in some industries, such as electrical machinery, and are stronger when subsidies are given through tax breaks than other policy instruments. The subsidy-led rise in trade calls for international cooperation to manage risks of retaliatory actions and possible drifts towards a subsidy war.
March 1, 2024
Medium-term Macroeconomic Effects of Russia’s War in Ukraine and How it Affects Energy Security and Global Emission Targets
Description: Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted the supply of natural gas for many European countries, triggering an energy crisis and affecting energy security. We simulate the medium-term effects of these trade disruptions and find that most European countries have limited GDP losses but those more dependent on Russian natural gas face moderate losses. European fossil fuel consumption and emissions are reduced and after accounting for the war impacts, achieving Europe’s emission targets becomes slightly less costly. In terms of energy security, the war eliminates European energy dependency from Russian imports, but most of the natural gas and oil imports will be substituted by other suppliers. We also find that constructing a new Russian pipeline to China does not provide significant macroeconomic benefits to either country.